Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 19

Issue 4

Article 5

10-1-2002

On Behalf of the Pap-ists: A Reply to Bergmann
Thomas P. Flint

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Flint, Thomas P. (2002) "On Behalf of the Pap-ists: A Reply to Bergmann," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of
the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 19 : Iss. 4 , Article 5.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil200219441
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol19/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

ON BEHALF OF THE PAP-ISTS:
A REPLY TO BERGMANN
Thomas P. Flint

In his "Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Free Will Defense,"

Michael Bergmann offers a clever and novel assault on the Principle of
Alternate Possibilities (PAP), one that avoids most of the traps that have hobbled other Frankfurtians. Nevertheless, the counterexample he proposes is
one where real questions can be raised concerning both the moral responsibility of the agent and the undetermined nature of his action. Furthermore, most
agent-causationists would insist that the situation Bergmann envisions is ultimately incoherent. Hence, whether or not Bergmann is right to reject PAP, his
argument offers us insufficient reason to do so.

Michael Bergmann's "Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the
Free Will Defense" offers an ingenious argument for the claim that, even if
we do not implicitly assume the falsity either of incompatibilism or of the
theory of agency, there is a solid Frankfurtian counterexample to the
Principle of Alternate Possibilities:
PAP. A person is morally responsible for performing a given act
only if she could have acted otherwise.
Bergmann's assault on PAP is novel and clever, one which avoids most of
the traps that have hobbled other Frankfurtians. What's more, his conclusion may well be correct; libertarian advocates of agent-causation may well
be able to reject PAP. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that his argument
can claim to have shown that this is the case.
Bergmann asks us to assume the admittedly controversial thesis that
there are counterfactual truths akin to the counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom that Molinists have famously defended in their discussions of
middle knowledge.! His counterexample involves a situation in which the
following counterfactual is true of a certain agent Jones:
A. If from t* until t Jones were in circumstances K and Demon didn't take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI [a volition to
pull the trigger of the gun in Jones's hand], then Jones would agentcause VI at t.
Assume that the antecedent of A is true and that the following conditional
is also true:
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C. If A were false, Demon would know it (long before t) and would
take away jones's powers at t with respect to VI.
Then, says Bergmann, Jones does agent-cause VI and is morally responsible for so doing (since Demon does not in fact need to intervene). But consider the propositions
E. From t* up until t Jones is in circumstances K

and

F. At t Jones exercises his power to do otherwise than cause VI at t.
We can show, says Bergmann, that
13. If C, then if E then -F
is a necessary truth. Since both C and E would have been true no matter
which of his powers Jones had exercised, it follows (via a type of transfer of
powerlessness principle) that F would have been false no matter which of
his powers Jones had exercised. So Jones can do nothing other than agentcause VI. And since he is, as we already noted, morally responsible for
agent-causing VI, it follows that Jones is morally responsible even though
he couldn't have done otherwise. Hence, PAP is false.
Problems for Bergmann begin to surface when we consider more carefully the second conjunct of the antecedent of A-that is,
G. Demon didn't take away Jones's powers at t with respect to VI.
G, alas, is ambiguous. It can be taken either as
Gl. Demon didn't take away all oJJones's powers at t with respect to
VI.
or as
G2. Demon didn't take away any a/Jones's powers at t with respect
to VI.
Which reading does Bergmann intend? Well, G is supposed to be true in
the counterexample Bergmann is constructing. But it's hard to see how G2
could be true in that situation. Demon, after all, has made C true, and the
result (if Bergmann is right) is that Jones lacks the power to do anything
other than cause VI, a power that presumably Jones would have had if
Demon either were not on the scene or had not formed the intention that
makes C true. 2 So it doesn't seem that G can be read as G2 if Bergmann's
argument is to work.'
What happens if we take G as GI rather than G2-Le., if we assume that
Bergmann's PAP-disconfirming situation is one in which Demon takes
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away some but not all of Jones's powers? As we have seen, Demon does
take away Jones's power to agent-cause anything other than VI. What
other powers might Jones have relative to VI? Many agency theorists, I
think, would say that he might have the power to do nothing with respect
to VI - the power to not agent-cause VI or anything else in the neighborhood. The idea here is not that Jones intentionally refrains from agent-causing VI, for then one might reasonably say that he does agent-cause something (the relevant intention) after all. Rather, the picture here is of the sort
of non-intentional refraining (if we can so call it) that goes on all the time.
Five minutes ago, I refrained in this sense from throwing my telephone out
the window. I had the power to de fenestrate the phone, but I failed to
exercise the power, not because I formed the intention not to exercise it, but
because I did nothing whatsoever with respect to the phone. Can Demon
leave Jones with this sort of power - the power to (non-intentionally)
refrain from agent-causing VI?
Suppose Jones were left with this power. What would have happened if
Jones were to exercise it? That is, if
R. Jones refrains from agent-causing VI at t

were true, what would follow? Well, there's no reason to think that Jones
wouldn't still be in circumstances K. 4 And, of course, if Jones refrains from
agent-causing VI when in K, it's not the case that he would agent-cause VI
if in K. So it seems clear that
(i) R ~ _AS

Now, Jones could exercise his power to refrain only if Demon has not
taken away that power. And if Demon didn't take away that power, then
obviously he didn't take away all of Jones's powers. So
(ii) R ~ GI
is also true. From (i) and (ii) it follows that
(iii) R ~ (-A & GI).
Clearly,
(iv) (-A & GI) => -(-A ~ -Gl)
is also true. From (iii) and (iv), it follows that
(v)

R~

-(-A ~ -Gl).6

Now, as BergmmID (correctly) notes, "the consequent of C entails the falsity of G". Since, as we've seen, G needs to be read as Gl, the consequent of
C entails the falsity of GI. And, given that the antecedent of C just is -A, it
follows that
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(vi) C:::::} (~A

---'7 ~GI).

Together, (v) and (vi) entail
(vii) R ---'7

~c.

So, if Demon leaves Jones with the power to refrain from doing anything
with respect to VI, then Jones has a power which, if exercised, would mean
the falsity of C. But if Jones has a power the exercise of which counterfactually implies the falsity of C, then C wouldn't have been true no matter
which of his powers Jones exercised. And thus the second part of
Bergmann's argument in section 2.4 would crumble, for premise 16 would
be demonstrably false.
So Bergmann cannot allow Demon to leave Jones the power even nonintentionally to refrain; Demon's behavior has to rob Jones even of this
power. The situation that results from Demon's making C true has to be
one in which Jones not only cannot agent-cause anything other than VI,
but also cannot (non-intentionally) refrain from agent-causing VI. But if
that is so, it seems to me that the counterexample is vulnerable on at least
three related fronts.
First, Jones's moral responsibility for agent-causing VI is much less clear
that it first appeared. Following the typical Frankfurtian line, Bergmann
asks us if Jones wouldn't clearly be responsible if there were no Demon;
adding Demon to the situation is then supposed to make no moral difference since Demon never intervenes. But if there were no Demon, none of
Jones's powers would have been snatched away from him. Why assume
that the presence of that panoply of powers plays no role in our thinking
that the Demon-less Jones is so obviously responsible? Bergmann employs
the ususal Frankfurtian misdirection when he says that, in the counterexample he describes, Jones acts "with absolutely no interference or influence
from Demon." Even if we agree that Demon doesn't cause Jones to agentcause VI, the fact that he's sealed off all other avenues - even that of nonintentionally refraining - makes nonsense of the claim that there has been
no interference or influence. And while the degree of Demonic intervention here may not make it obvious that Jones is not responsible, it surely
does call that responsibility into question.
In raising this first objection, we assumed that Demon doesn't cause
Jones's act of causing VI. The second problem with Bergmann's counterexample is that this assumption seems questionable. Demon has set up a situation in which there's only one thing Jones can cause, and where he can't
refrain from exercising his power to cause it. This surely seems like a situation in which Demon has caused Jones to exercise his power to agent-cause
VI. And this even Bergmann would allow cannot be; his third condition of
agent causation (AC in section 1.2) implies that nothing distinct from Jones
could cause Jones to agent-cause anything. So Bergmann's counterexample
may be incoherent even on his own account of agent-causation.
The third problem for Bergmann is that, whatever the implications of his
notion of agent-causation on his counterexample, the situation he envisions
is one which is clearly incoherent on the picture of agent-causation that is, I
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suspect, most widely embraced. On that picture, one that the paterfamilias
of agency theory himself, Thomas Reid, clearly promoted, it simply makes
no sense to say that a person has the power to cause something but not the
power not to cause it. As we have seen, Bergmann's counterexample
requires that Demon leave Jones with the power to cause VI, but not with
the power to refrain from causing it. And that, Reid and company would
insist, is simply impossible: "Power to produce any effect, implies power
not to produce it."7
Despite its many virtues, then, Bergmann's attack on PAP seems seriously deficient. Whether or not that means that PAP itself, or at least
something very much like PAP, should be embraced by the agent-causationist libertarian is, of course, another matter.8 If there are cogent reasons
to abandon or modify PAP, though, agent-causationists are not likely to
find them in Bergmann's argument. 9

University of Notre Dame
NOTES

1. As Bergmann is aware, the conditionals he employs in his argument are
distinct from those that Molinists have defended. Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom have antecedents that are complete (i.e., that include all the "hard
facts" over which the agent in question has no control) and consequents that
state how the agent in question would freely act. Bergmann's subjunctive conditionals of agent causation make no claim to have complete antecedents and
make no assumption concerning the freedom of the acts of agent-causation
mentioned in their consequents.
2. I am assuming that C's truth is dependent upon Demon's actions. This
surely seems to be implied by Bergmann's contention (in defense of his
Premise 16) that Jones could have no power over C because its truth is grounded in "the firmness of Demon's plan. . .. Demon is committed to acting in
accord with c." Demon's actions (his making plans and commitments), then,
have resulted in the truth of C. Indeed, it seems clear that Bergmann should
also maintain that C's truth is the consequence of Demon's undetermined
actions. For suppose that the causal history of the world (H) and the laws of
nature (L) at the time of Demon's planning together entailed Demon's action,
and thus entailed C. Assuming the soundness of Bergmann's argument that C
entails (E:::l -F), it would then follow that (H & L) entails (E :::l -F). And from
this it would follow that (H & L & E) entails -F. But it's hard to see how
Jones's act of agent-causing VI could be seen as anything other than causally
determined if this final entailment held. And, of course, even given
Bergmmm's account of agent causation (AC in section 1.2), it's simply impossible for an event to be both agent-caused and causally determined. So, if
Bergmann is to avoid such problems, he'd best insist that the act of Demon's
upon which C depends not be a causally determined act.
3. G2 would be, for Bergmann, an unfriendly reading of G for a slightly
more technical reason as well: it renders the first part of his argument in section 2.4 invalid. That argument requires that G be entailed by F. But G2 doesn't follow from F. What F entails is that Demon didn't take away Jones's
power to do otherwise than cause VI; it doesn't entail that Demon left Jones
with the power to cause VI. So, though F does entail GI, it doesn't entail G2.
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If G were read as G2, then, the argument would collapse.
4. If one thought that circumstances K wouldn't still obtain if Jones were to

exercise his power to refrain from agent-causing VI, one would be doing
Bergmann no favors, for then the second part of his argument in section 2.4
would dissolve, since 19 would no longer hold.
5. Here and throughout, I use the single-line arrow (~) to represent counterfactual implication and the double-line arrow (~) to represent strict implication (i.e., entailment).
6. The principle that warrants the move from (iii) and (iv) to (v) could be
stated as, "If (X ~ Y) and (Y ~ Z), then (X ~ Z)".
7. From the 1983 printing by Georg Olms Verlag of The Works of Thomas
Reid, 8th ed., ed. by William Hamilton (Edinburgh, 1895), p. 523. Quoted in
William Rowe, "The Metaphysics of Freedom: Reid's Theory of Agent

Causation,"American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2000), p. 445.
8. For what it's worth, I must confess that I am not myself a confirmed
PAP-ist; my suspicion is that PAP isn't quite what the agent-causationist needs.
Even a Reidean agent-causationist, I think, could grant the possibility of a situation where the only options Demon leaves open for Jones are agent-causing
VI or refraining from causing anything. If Jones were in that case to agentcause VI, he would seem to be morally responsible. But he could not have
done anything else. His only alternative was to (non-intentionally) refrain, and
such a refraining is not a doing. Even if PAP is discredited by such examples,
though, it seems clear that it has close relatives that would prove more resilient
- e.g., something along the lines of
PAP* A person is morally responsible for perforIillng a given act only if
she could have (non-intentionally) refrained from performing it
or perhaps
PAP** A person is morally responsible for agent-causing X only if she
could have (non-intentionally) refrained from agent-causing X.
9. I wish to thank Stewart Goetz for his helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.

